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Abstract: Since the establishment of commercial sharing economy services like Uber, Blablacar,
Lyft,  Airbnb,  TaskRabbit,  etc.,  the  debate  about  the  sharing  economy  and  its  effects  on
competition has generated lively discussions, which have too often dangerously departed from a
debate based on objective (market) observation to evolve into a quarrel among the supporters
and opponents of the online platforms. Undoubtedly, the peculiar features of these new firms’
business models create frictions with the traditional regulatory environment, which currently
appears  to  be  incapable  of  framing  them  into  models  and  schemes  typical  of  a  previous
economic phase, such as, for example, one-sided markets, no externalities, and competition
mainly on price. Nevertheless, setting aside the more or less impromptu debate about the “social
goodness” of these firms, we argue that competition enforcers should look at their effective
market power. In fact, as the basic principles of competition law teach us, only when those firms
have  (more  or  less  legitimate)  significant  market  power,  will  they  be  subject  to  special
responsibilities  and  to  stringent  restrictions  and  obligations.  Toward  this  aim,  it  is  first
necessary to define the relevant market. And, immediately afterwards, to delimit firms’ market
position. This, in turn, should help to assess their compliance with the competition rules and the
obligations that they are – or rather that they should be – subjected to. This exercise is not an
easy one because the traditional regulatory concepts and definitions do not seem to reflect the
competition dynamics that characterise the new markets on which we are reflecting. In this
paper we focus on a number of challenges that are posed by the sharing economy businesses,
suggesting that they could be solved with the traditional competition instruments, although
adapted to the peculiar features of the markets that are at stake. These include, among others,
multi-sidedness and the presence of different externalities.
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BACK TO BASICS
The effects of the sharing economy on competition continue to trigger an intense debate, which
has too often departed from concrete market observations to evolve into a quarrel among the
supporters and opponents of some of the online platforms, which each of us will have come
across.
One area in which the debate often departs from reality is in terms of dimensioning. The world
economy is not all about sharing platforms. This is certainly a very fast growing and rapidly
evolving phenomenon, which will affect an increasing number of economic sectors. However, it
is estimated that its size, over the next decade will amount to something around 0.5% of world
GDP (Credit Suisse, 2015).
Nonetheless, online platforms which allow demand and supply for goods and services to meet
have become more and more present in daily life, and they are certainly key players in a number
of  markets  where  they  represent  the  benchmark  for  future  developments.  Meanwhile,  the
sharing  economy  businesses  are  impacting,  in  a  disruptive  way,  an  increasing  number  of
traditional  business  models  and  industries  (De  Streel  and  Larouche,  2015;
Monopolkommission,  2015).
Put together, this poses an urgent and interesting challenge to competition enforcers and, at the
same time, it necessitates more careful discussion than has occurred so far. The features of
many  of  the  sharing  economy firms’  business  models  create  frictions  with  the  traditional
regulatory environment, which often appears to be not properly equipped to frame them within
models  and  schemes  typical  of  a  previous  economic  phase.  This  is  true  not  only  from  a
competition  perspective,  but  also  from,  by  way  of  example,  labour  law  and  the  sectorial
regulation perspectives.
Setting aside the (more or less) impromptu debate about the “social goodness” of those firms,
the enforcers of competition rules should work to overcome the current feeling of inadequacy or,
even worse, of the uselessness of the discipline in observing and assessing the phenomenon and
the ability to adequately intervene, if this is needed.
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On  the  contrary,  competition  rules  are  fundamental  and  must  accompany  this  phase  of
economic change, disruption and innovation, and even more intensely so in the near future.
Empirical work has been abundant over recent years (among others: OECD, 2015; Aghion,
Bechtold, Cassar, and Herz, 2014; Gomellini, 2013); yet what is missing is a concrete adaptation
of well-established principles into the new economic scenario, taking into account what we have
recently learnt about two-sided markets and the externalities thereof.
In fact, multi-sided market scenarios pose peculiar practical problems that take competition
rules out of their traditional comfort zone; this, in turn, implies the application of the toolkit
that has been developed over decades of enforcement and litigation in a renewed way. Which
does not mean that the toolkit has to be considered to be a dinosaur.
This paper is the beginning of a longer work that we intend to carry out on sharing economy
platforms. We start by suggesting some approaches for the definition of the relevant market in
the digital economy. We do so after having briefly described the main and peculiar features of
online platforms and of their business model(s), together with the main challenges that they
pose to competition law.
THE SHARING ECONOMY AND PLATFORMS: SOME
USEFUL DEFINITIONS
For many scholars, the sharing economy describes “a rise of new business models (‘platforms’)
that uproot traditional markets, break down industry categories, and maximise the use of scarce
resources”  (see  among  others:  Allen  &  Berg,  2014).  Slightly  differently,  the  European
Commission defines the collaborative economy as being “a complex ecosystem of on-demand
services and temporary use of assets based on exchanges via online platforms” (Upgrading the
single market, Communication of October 2015).
Both of these definitions attribute a key role to online platforms, which are the most typical
example of firms adopting a two-sided business model. Literature on two-sided markets and
models has developed massively in the last few years (Rochet and Tirole, 2006; Genakos and
Valletti, 2012; Filistrucchi, Geradin, van Damme, and Affeldt, 2014; Hagiu and Write, 2015).
However, it is not within the scope of this paper to analyse this literature. What matters for this
paper  is  to  specify  that  although  there  appears  to  be  some confusion  in  the  way  certain
terminology is used in the current debate, two-sidedness should refer either to markets or,
eventually, to business models, but not to platforms per se (Baden-Fuller and Haefliger, 2013).
Indeed, scholars commonly recognise some of the features of online platforms as adopting two-
sided business models (Ruhmer, 2011; Jullien, 2011; Filistrucchi, Geradin, and van Damme,
2013; Evans and Schmalensee, 2013). As is known, these are firms selling two different products
or  services  to  two  different  groups  of  customers,  where  the  demand  from  one  group  of
customers  depends  on the  demand from the  other  group of  customers  (interdependency).
Platforms help to coordinate the participation of buyers and sellers (both users of the platform),
to reduce the interaction costs for the two groups of users so that all agents are better off and
receive positive network effects through using the platform. The interdependency among the
group of users creates indirect (positive) network effects, as the value of the platform for one
group of users grows with the growing of the user base on the other side of the platform (see the
Introduction to this Special Issue by Erickson & Sørensen, 2016). These effects increase the
value that the economic actors can realise from using the platform. All of these features boost
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sharing economy businesses, whose majority relies on low interaction costs and a wide base of
users in order to work efficiently.
In fact, while traditional markets are one-sided -- think of any business such as taxis, food sales,
shopping centres, gasoline stations, professional activities -- in certain cases, markets can be
“natively” two-sided, such as online search engines. However, as we will explain in more detail
later  in this  paper,  the same market  can encompass economic activities  adopting different
business models, and so can a single firm. On the other hand platforms are simply technological
instruments that, by their very nature, are neither one nor two-sided. What is two-sided is the
business model that they choose, or the market in which they operate.
These are not just formalistic clarifications. While making the definition of the market more
complex, the two-sidedness should neither generate confusion nor validate the tendency to
necessarily consider each business model as a separate market. This would result in an incorrect
approach  to  market  definition,  which  could  severely  distort  assessment  by  enforcers  and,
consequently, the remedies that are proposed or imposed by them.
Platforms act as intermediaries and internalise the externalities generated by each of the two
groups of customers for the other one (that is,  that are not externalities for the platform).
Externalities for the users are typically two-fold. Usage externalities are verified because the two
groups of users need to act together and use the platform to reciprocally create value. They are
mutually indispensable to making a valuable exchange. In addition, membership externalities
exist because the value generated for one group of users increases with the number of users on
the other side of the platform. These result in a positive feedback loop, whereby more users on
one side attract more users on the other side.
The platform plays a crucial role in creating these indirect network effects for users, as its main
interest  is  to  develop the  largest  possible  critical  mass  of  subscribers  on both  sides  (“the
community  of  users”).  The  platform  creates  network  effects  for  its  users  via  price  and
commercial strategies (including marketing and design), to balance its interest with those of the
two groups. The interests of each group that is related to the use of the platform are different
from those of  the  other  group,  both in  terms of  price  and of  the  demanded services  and
functionalities. Economists have described this as the “chicken and egg problem”, a situation
where “to attract buyers an intermediary should have a large base of registered sellers, but these
will be willing to register only if they expect many buyers to show up” (Caillaud and Jullien,
2003). This inevitably affects price strategies, which tend to favour the group of customers with
the higher level of indirect network effect.
In relation to the price strategies adopted by platforms structured according to a two-sided
model, one of the main differences to be noted is between transaction and non-transaction
platforms. In the former, there is a transaction between the customers of the platform via the
same platform (e.g., e-hailing car service, auction houses, credit cards), while in the latter there
is no such a transaction (e.g., media, traditional TV). Digital platforms are typically of the first
type.
Now, why does this matter for competition law? In a very simple manner, this matters because it
strictly  affects  market definition and the identification of  market power.  As mentioned,  by
adopting  a  two-sided business  model  to  intermediate  supply  and demand,  a  platform can
potentially turn a traditionally one-sided market into a two-sided one. This can open traditional
markets to new players who become competitors to the historical incumbents.
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What usually happens is that the newcomers exercise a potentially significant market pressure
on  traditional  players.  This  is  particularly  the  case  for  transaction  platforms,  that  can
competitively use leverage on price and that can do so on both sides of the market (while
traditional players operating on one-sided markets have a unidirectional price structure). In
addition,  sharing  economy  platforms  can  usually  count  on  lower  fixed  and  variable  costs
(including workforce costs), the possibility to reach a wider audience of potential customers in a
much shorter time, a reputation building process that relies on instruments that are often
unavailable to traditional players. Finally, experience has shown that the rise of these platforms
is so rapid and massive, that a winner-takes-all dynamic often ensues. The consequence is thus
that platforms can act as gatekeepers, impeding the entry of subsequent new players into the
market and slowing down innovation.
In a nutshell, what we have discussed above suggests that, when it comes to online platforms,
assessing market power becomes a fundamental challenge for competition enforcers. As the
basic principles of competition law teach us, only when firms detain significant market power,
will they be subject to a special responsibility, and thus to stringent restrictions and obligations.
As is known, economists define market power as the ability to raise prices consistently and
profitably above competitive level/marginal costs. We, as lawyers, would rather use the words of
the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European Union,  which  defines  it  as  the  power  to  act  ‘to  an
appreciable  extent  independently  of  its  competitors,  its  customers  and  ultimately  of  the
consumers’ (Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche). There is no valid reason why this should not be
applied to online platforms also.
In a similar fashion, competition rules are intended to make sure also that online platforms
operating two-sided business models do not illegally gain market power (cartels), misuse their
legitimate market power (abuse of dominance), or create players with too much market power
who alter the competition dynamics on the relevant market(s) (mergers control).
What may change is the way that market power is assessed. In fact, in these businesses, the
latter  often  does  not  coincide  with  the  market  share;  or,  at  least,  it  does  so  less  than in
traditional businesses. It is enough to remind the reader that in the sharing economy, users, the
community  of  reference,  reputation and trust  play a  fundamental  role.  With the temporal
dimension of market power to be evaluated carefully, in a way that was unknown until a few
years ago.
Having said that, it remains true that to properly assess market power in online platforms, as in
any other sector, it is first necessary to perform an exercise, which may appear to be extremely
obvious and predictable, notwithstanding the fact that only a few have carefully done it so far: to
properly define the relevant market,  and, immediately afterwards,  to identify the actual  or
potential competitors of the relevant firms, to delimit the latter’s market position and to be able
eventually to assess their compliance with the competition rules and the obligations to which
they are – or rather should be – subjected.
DEFINING THE RELEVANT MARKET
As has been seen, sharing economy platforms and businesses create a number of problems
concerning  the  application  of  competition  principles  and models.  To  solve  them,  the  first
question competition enforcers are called to ask themselves is how to define the relevant market
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in which these platforms operate.
This  means,  for  example,  establishing  whether  Uber  creates  a  new market,  or  whether  it
competes with taxi services. Or to determine whether Google does or does not compete with
Amazon. To do so, various elements need to be taken into account, such as, among others, the
characteristics  of  the  different  services  and  their  prices.  Moreover,  the  market  definition
exercise, in the case of the sharing economy platforms, usually raises a number of additional
questions,  which  scholars  and  policymakers  have  a  lively  debate  about,  although no  final
answers appear to have been found yet. In this section, we focus on what we believe to be the
most important of those elements so as to draw a few guidelines for future analysis.
Before doing so, we briefly remind the reader that, in competition assessment, a commonly used
tool with which to define the relevant product market is the so-called “Small-but-Significant-
Non-Transitory-Increase-in-Price-Test” (SSNIP test). It consists of observing whether a small
increase in price (in the range of  5 to 10 percent)  would provoke a significant number of
consumers to  switch to  another  product  (in  fact,  a  substitute  product).  In other  words,  it
analyses whether that increase in price would be profitable or if, instead, it would just induce
substitution,  making  it  unprofitable  for  the  firm.  Following  the  European  Commission’s
approach,  the  test  is  essential  in  the  definition  of  the  relevant  market,  because  “product
characteristics and intended use are insufficient to show whether two products are demand
substitutes […] differences in product characteristics are not in themselves sufficient to exclude
demand substitutability […]” (European Commission, 1997). However, as we will explain below,
in the context of the sharing economy this test needs further adaptations.
We have mentioned that the sharing economy is characterised by various technologies and
business models. This is true specifically for the sharing economy platforms, but also more
generally  for  electronic  communications,  media  and  the  so-called  Over-The-Top  (OTT)
services.<fn>One example is the “triple play” package of network operators, which may allow
the latter to differentiate their offers from those of competitors by adding the provision of pay-
TV  content.  </fn>  By  way  of  example,  copper  and  fiber  communication  networks,  cable
networks, Wi-Fi networks, LTE networks, etc., from a user’s perspective can all well belong to
the same market. The overlapping of different technologies constitutes the first challenge for
market definition. Nevertheless, if, as mentioned, demand substitutability is the key criterion for
identifying the relevant market,  then when multiple technologies can be used for the same
purpose and users perceive them to be interchangeable,  we should consider that all  of the
providers of these different technologies are competing in the same market. Good examples are
OTT and SMS messaging systems, as well as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and traditional
calls. In the sharing economy, one of the best known examples might be that of traditional taxis
and Uber.
As for business models, we notice that a number of them can be present in the same market,
while this was, and is, rarely the case with traditional industries. Not only can competing firms
each use a different business model, think, for example, about BlaBlaCar and Lyft for ride-
sharing, or Airbnb and Couchsurfing for room sharing, but, what is more, even a single firm can
decide to adopt more than a single business model on the same market, depending on the
specific product or service it provides. A good example is Amazon. In fact, in the market of
shopping malls, the company operates as a one-sided model for some products like new books,
buying them at a wholesale price and selling them at a retail price. For other products, such as
clothes and electronics, Amazon acts as the provider of a web portal for producers who set their
retail  prices directly (Rysman, 2009; Broos and Ramos, 2015). Another example is Spotify,
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which offers free and premium access, depending on the service required.
However, while it is true that the presence of various business models complicates the definition
of the market boundaries, on the other hand, we have already expressed our concerns in regard
to the overlap between the concepts of the market and the business model, as the former can
embrace more than one of the latter. What is more, one might argue that the fact that different
business models are adopted can be interpreted as a signal of the existence of competitive
constraints on the market, rather than as the existence of separate markets. Let’s take once
again Uber as an example. If we consider its business model to constitute a market, then we
should conclude that  Uber  and traditional  taxis  operate  on two different  markets.  On the
contrary, if we do not overlap the concepts, we could argue that they both operate in the same
marketplace, and that the existence, within the latter of their two different business models puts
competitive pressure on each of them (see Leiren and Aarhaug, 2016, in this issue). Once again,
demand substitutability helps in the exercise of defining the relevant market. In fact, as long as
users see two or more different offers as being substitutable, we shall assume that providers are
competitors in the same market. A meaningful example is pay-TV and free-to-air TV. In this
case, different financing mechanisms are chosen by providers -- and consequently different
business models are adopted -- so it is not sufficient to identify two separate markets; this
happens only if viewers do not consider the two services to be substitutable.<fn>We consider
this example to be meaningful in supporting our argument. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that
the approach followed by different competition authorities, both in Europe and abroad, has
been various. The European Commission, in the cases BSky/KirchPayTv, NewsCorp/Premier
and Antena 3/La Sexta, considered pay-TV to be a relevant product market that is separated
from the free-TV market. On the contrary, the UK Competition and Market Authority has taken
a different approach, and in the case BSky/ITV, has defined one relevant market comprising
different business models: pay-TV and free-TV. As for scholars, see Calvani, E. and Polo M.,
2014; Peitz, M. and Valletti, T., 2015). </fn> With concrete reference to a sharing economy, a
good example is Airbnb. Assessing whether it operates in the same market as traditional hotels
or B&B private rentals depends, among other factors, on whether travelers consider the former
to be a substitute for the latter.
Another element to which we would like to draw attention to is supply side substitutability. In
fact, numerous sharing economy platforms offer a wide range of qualities or grades of one
product/service.  In  addition,  they  are  able  to  switch  production  to  the  relevant
products/services and to market them in the short term without incurring significant additional
costs or risks in response to small and permanent changes in the relative prices (Commission
Notice,  1997).  As is  known, this  is  possible thanks to the wide possibilities  offered by the
extensive dematerialisation and the consequent dramatic drop in production and transaction
costs, which are brought about by the internet revolution. On the contrary, this does not happen
for traditional industries like, among other, transport, accommodation, and the pharmaceutical
and chemical industries, whose switches in production would imply gigantic costs and long
transition periods. All things considered, we believe that the supply side substitutability could
play a weightier role in the definition of the relevant market.<fn>By way of example, some
scholars have applied the test to Google Search and Google Shopping, concluding that they are
substitutable for advertisers. See Broos and Ramos (2015). </fn>
Furthermore, because of the two-sidedness of most sharing economy platforms, whether by
nature or by business model, we need to further adapt the SSNIP test in order to take into due
account the cross-group externalities, which give rise to network effects. To start, usually two-
sided platforms can set two prices, one for each side of the market, thus, the first question is to
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identify which price the hypothetical monopolist should raise. Moreover, because both sides are
linked through cross-group external effects, and therefore the profitability depends on the price
level on both sides, the second question is whether one should consider the profitability on one
side or on the other. The most adequate solution, because it takes into account not only the
prices on the two sides, but also the externalities, appears to be the following. In the case of
non-transaction platforms one should check the profitability of a price increase on each side,
while in the case of transaction platforms, one should check the profitability of an increase in the
total price level, in other words, the sum of the prices paid by the transactions of the two parties.
By way of example, in the case of Airbnb, the test should be made on the sum of the transaction
fees paid to the platform by the property owner and the traveller.
An additional element to consider when applying the SSNIP test is that in a number of sharing
economy businesses the users do not pay for the product/service. The platforms therefore have
to  compete  on  other  attributes,  such  as  quality,  extensive  distribution,  new  product
developments, the respect of privacy and data protection, etc. If, on the one hand, it is true that
those attributes are more difficult to quantify, on the other hand, it is also to be noted that, both
at the academic and enforcement levels, there is a rising attention being placed on innovation
and its role as a parameter of  competitive pressure.<fn>Among the contributions given by
scholars,  see Ibanez Colomo, P. (2015).  As for the enforcement side, good examples of the
attention dedicated to innovation and incentives to innovate in the framework of a competition
analysis are the following: Microsoft (COMP/C-3.37.792) Intel/McAfee (COMP/M.5984), and
the current Google case, i.e. Google Search (COMP/AT.39740); Google Android (AT.40099) and
Google Search Adsense (COMP/AT.40411).</fn> In fact, if we look at the sharing economy
businesses, we notice that the acquisition of market power, and, in parallel, the establishment of
a wide community of users, largely depend on the innovative nature of the service/product
offered. Moreover, it is undeniable that disruptive innovators are gaining scale rapidly, while it
often becomes difficult, if not impossible, for competitors to keep pace or to create a customer
base that could allow them to effectively compete. The combination of innovation and rapidity is
extremely relevant in shaping competition dynamics in the market.
As has been confirmed by the above,  defining the relevant market,  in the case of  sharing
economy businesses, and more generally in two-sided platforms, is not a simple exercise. A clear
conceptual framework has not yet emerged. Furthermore, the case law is not of great help; in
fact, if we look at the enforcement practice, we still notice a number of inconsistencies. By way of
example,  in the Google/DoubleClick case (COMP/M.4731),  only one market was taken into
account  during  the  merger’s  assessment.  On  the  contrary,  in  the  MasterCard  case
(COMP/36.518), the European Commission shifted its approach and looked at two interrelated
markets. Moreover, while usually the two-sidedness of a market is – rightly - taken into account
when defining the relevant  market,  in  at  least  one case,  that  is  Microsoft/Yahoo Inc.,  the
Commission looked at this peculiar feature only at the stage of the competitive assessment.
We are conscious of the complexity of the issue. Nevertheless, as mentioned at the beginning of
this section, we have tried to identify a number of guidelines concerning demand and supply
substitutability,  network effects,  and competition on quality  aspects,  rather than price,  the
relevance of scale and innovation, that should be taken into due account while performing the
analysis from a competition perspective. Before concluding this part, we would like to mention
two more aspects that, in our view, deserve close attention.
First, we believe it to be extremely important to look at the geographical dimension of the
market. If, on the one hand, it is true that a number of sharing economy platforms depend on a
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local dimension - in order to work effectively users on both sides need to be physically close - on
the other  hand,  many of  the sharing economy businesses  have rapidly  acquired scale  and
currently operate on a global basis. Defining the geographical market in one way or another can
have strong implications. In fact, the lack of global enforcement powers makes very likely that
the identification of global markets is not followed by the capacity to enforce competition rules
in the same way everywhere. On the other hand, if we define the market as being local, we are
confronted with the necessity of coordinating enforcement actions on a national, regional or
even global level, or sharing economy firms will have to cope with the burden of shaping a
different business model for each local market in which they operate around the world. Finally,
the definition of the geographic dimension of the market can have a strong impact on merger
assessments.
The second and final issue that we would like to raise in this section concerns the “temporal”
dimension of the relevant market, and, in particular, aims to reflect on its duration. In extremely
dynamic and innovative markets such as those of  the sharing economy businesses,  market
boundaries  change rapidly,  for  at  least  two reasons.  First,  technological  developments  and
(disruptive) innovation happen at a fast pace. Secondly, new technologies often allow, or even
push, for convergence among traditionally separated markets. In both cases, the SSNIP test is
affected, and then the definition of the relevant market changes. Consequently, competition
enforcers should find the appropriate way to balance the need for legal certainty for companies,
and the need not to artificially crystallise market analysis.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
It is a time of great and rapid change. This holds true for the world economy and, thus, for
competition law and economics.
The challenges posed by new technologies and their growing effects on industries should not
scare competition enforcers, nor should it put them in a sort of residual mood, where some
would like to confine them on the assumption that everything in the sharing economy is about
self-regulated reputation.
As we have tried to show in this paper, the principles of competition law that have developed
over time are still valid, and the toolkit that is in the hands of both companies and enforcers is
still useful if smartly adapted to the new economic scenario and its extremely fast evolution.
There is certainly no one-size-fits-all approach. As platforms are very different, analysis should
be case-specific. However, bearing in mind the principles of the discipline, some guidelines can
be identified – even if only in terms of the mistakes to be avoided.
Markets, platforms and their related business models, do not have to be mixed up, otherwise
market definition would be misguided, bearing in mind that the same company can operate with
several business models (and on several markets), and that the same market can be exploited in
many different ways.
Demand side substitutability will play a crucial role in identifying who is competing with whom.
However, given the decreasing production costs that are related to the internet economy, to
switch production is much easier and much less risky than in the traditional industries, so that
supply side substitutability should play a larger role in market definition.
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In addition, network effects and cross-group externalities should be carefully considered when
using the SSNIP test. Together with non-price competition, which, in many platforms, is the key
business feature, quality, distribution and – above all – the innovation pace of the services and
products offered, are seminal in attracting customers, creating a large user base and, thus,
exercising a difficult-to-face competitive pressure on other players.
As mentioned, these elements should be balanced with the temporal dimension of the market
and with the degree of (fast) disruption characterising many online businesses.
It is not the first time that great economic and social transformations have posed dramatic
challenges to competition law and have forced it  to (re)evaluate consolidated case law and
principles, by exiting from its comfort zone. By way of example, the end of the state monopolies
between the close of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, as well as the consolidation of
many markets  into oligopolies  on the eve of  the new millennium, were periods that  were
certainly no less full of queries for competition law than the situation we are in today. In those
times, the discipline was able to reinterpret itself and to play a crucial role in the economy,
growth and innovation. Now, it is time to play a similar role.
Defining the relevant market in the sharing economy
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